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Heller, Citizenship, and the
Right to Serve in the Military
ELIZABETH L. HILLMAN*
INTRODUCTION
District of Columbia v. Heller' could prove a turning point not only
for the right to keep and bear arms, but for the constitutional right to
serve in the military. In the wake of Heller, constitutional law theorists
like Akhil Reed Amar have reasserted the premise that the Second
Amendment might protect a right to military service.! Meanwhile, legal
historians like Sanford Levinson have taken the Court to task for its
lapses in historical accuracy, subtlety, and depth.' This Essay seeks to
bring those two perspectives together by analyzing Heller in light of
military history and constitutional doctrine. It argues that the Court
neglected two critical contexts: the long-recognized link between
citizenship and military service, and the changes -demographic,
technological, and geopolitical -that have remade the United States
military since the Constitution was drafted and ratified. Ultimately, it
casts Heller as a source of support for those who would assert a
constitutional right to military service despite Justice Antonin Scalia's
protests to the contrary.4 The right to keep and bear arms intersects with
the right to serve in the military. As a result, Heller's holding and
reasoning raise new issues relevant to the question of whether the
Constitution acknowledges a right to military service. Because the Court
overlooked changes in the meaning and nature of military service, it
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. I am grateful to
Professor Calvin Massey, the editors of the Hastings Law Journal, and the participants in the Journal's
Symposium. All errors are my own.
I. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2oo8).
2. See Akhil Reed Amar, Heller, HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning, 122 HARV. L. REv. 145,
188-89 (2008).
3. See, e.g., Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory: District of Columbia v.
Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 6o HASTINGs L.J. 1371, 1372 (2oo9) ("Whatever the Court is doing here,
it is not rigorously grounded in eighteenth-century sources."); Sanford Levinson, Opening Remarks at
the Hastings Law Journal Symposium: The Second Amendment After Heller (Feb. 13, 20o9) (terming
the history in Heller "tendentious").
4. See infra Part III.
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unreasonably limited the reach of its Second Amendment analysis to
stop short of recognizing that an individual right to keep and bear arms
must, given the role of twenty-first century military service in the United
States, also protect a right to serve in the armed forces. The approach
that Heller takes to the right to keep and bear arms should lead to a
reconsideration of military service as a broadly held and recognized
right, and point toward a model of full, and equal, participation in the
armed forces for "the people."
By favoring a fine-grained study of the colonial and early republic
periods over any substantial engagement with subsequent
transformations in war-making, national defense, and citizenship, the
Court compounded its mistakes in historical methodology. It also failed
to reckon with how those changes implicate the now-recognized
individual right to keep and bear arms. Both the Court's opinion and
Justice John Paul Stevens's dissent detail the rationales for-and the
origins of-a militia of the people. They describe the limits on those who
might serve in that militia, on what sorts of weapons might therefore be
protected against government seizure, and for what purposes those
weapons are protected.' Yet the Court does not account for either the
political meaning of military service or the dramatic changes in United
States military institutions since the ratification of the Second
Amendment. Those profound changes matter for the meaning of the
right to keep and bear arms, and for the related right to serve in the
military.
I. MILITARY HISTORY ACCORDING TO HELLER
In an effort to establish the original intent of the Second
Amendment,6 Justice Scalia, writing for a five-member majority, defines
the "well regulated Militia" of the Amendment's opening clause. He
writes that "the 'militia' in colonial America consisted of a subset of 'the
people'-those who were male, able bodied, and within a certain age
range."7 Justice Scalia later returns to this assessment. He explains that
the Framers considered the militia "all males physically capable of acting
in concert for the common defense," and argues that the "militia" of the
Second Amendment is much larger than the organized, federal military.8
5. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2799-801 (2oo8); id. at 2844-46
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
6. U.S. CoNsr. amend. II. For one of many critiques of the Court's originalism, see Daniel A.
Farber, Disarmed By Time: The Second Amendment and the Failure of Originalism, 76 CM.-KENT L.
REv. 167 (2000).
7. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2791.
8. Id. at 2799-8oo (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)).
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Justice Scalia then turns to the purpose of that militia, and reads
"the security of a free state" to mean "the security of a free polity."9 A
militia, he writes, protects that security by "repelling invasions and
suppressing insurrections," by "render[ing] large standing armies
unnecessary," and by ensuring that "the able-bodied men of a nation are
trained in arms and organized," and therefore will be "better able to
resist tyranny."'" Justice Scalia cites nineteenth century sources to stress
the importance of a population of freemen trained in arms and ready to
be called forth in defense of the nation," and he stresses the Second
Amendment's role in protecting "a populace familiar with arms" in order
to counter a standing army."
The Court's opinion acknowledges the limited utility of eighteenth-
century handguns in contemporary national defense, but dismisses it as
having little bearing on the individual right to keep and bear arms.'3
Justice Scalia also acknowledges the gulf between the militia as
conceived by the Framers of the Constitution and the professional armed
forces of the United States today.'4 But he denies that such a dramatic
change in historical circumstances can render the Second Amendment
"extinct."' 5 The Court, then, makes no effort to assess the impact of those
changes.
Even the dissenting voices on the Court largely disregard two
centuries of military history after the Second Amendment became part
of the Constitution. The two dissents, like the majority opinion, note the
changes in military service, but do not draw out their implications.'
6
Justice Stevens's dissent construes the history surrounding the Second
Amendment very differently than does Justice Scalia.'7 Justice Stevens
also sees military history as much more central to the Second
Amendment than does the Court. He argues that the right to keep and
bear arms is a single, unitary right that describes precisely what members
of an organized military, or militia, do.'8 Justice Stevens also points out
that the fear of a standing army was profound, as was the fear of an
inadequately trained force,'9 but he does not suggest that the nature of
9. Id. at 28oo.
to. Id. at 28oo-oi.
ii. Id. at 2811.
12. id.
13. Id. at 2816.
14. Id. at 2822 ("Undoubtedly some think that the Second Amendment is outmoded in a society
where our standing army is the pride of our Nation, where well-trained police forces provide personal
security, and where gun violence is a serious problem.").
15. Id.
16. See id. at 2822-47 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2847-68 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
17. See id. at 2822-47 (Stevens, ., dissenting).
i8. Id. at 2830.
19. Id. at 2831.
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the contemporary armed forces matters in the legal construction of the
Second Amendment right.
Justice Breyer's dissent does not rely on historical sources in the
same way that Justices Stevens's and Scalia's opinions do, but it does
refer to military realities in the course of dismissing policy-based
arguments against gun control and regulation. Justice Breyer cites to an
amicus brief filed by retired generals that asserted that military recruits
with training in firearms are helpful for the armed forces because they
are more easily trained." Justice Breyer accepts this statement as
accurate and points out that the regulation in question would not
interfere with those who sought familiarity with firearms, because the
restriction does not preclude firearms training.2' Justice Breyer, like
Justices Scalia and Stevens, nods at the distinctions between the
eighteenth and twenty-first century militaries but does not draw any
conclusions from them.2
II. THE MILITARY: THEN AND Now
Given the importance of a "well regulated Militia" in the text of the
Second Amendment, the Court might reasonably have considered the
historical evolution of the American military in interpreting the right to
keep and bear arms. If the Court had explored this history, it would have
sidestepped the quarrel over the eighteenth century meaning of the right
to bear arms in favor of comparing the early twenty-first century United
States Armed Forces to the military forces of the Revolutionary War and
the early republic. Such a comparison would have revealed tremendous,
substantive differences, on virtually every level, between the militaries of
these eras. As the U.S. military changed in response to changes in politics
and technology, the culture and organization of the armed forces
changed as well. Professionalization took hold of the American military
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 3 and the Cold War
brought an even more dramatic change: a permanent military force,
sizable even in times of relative peace. 4 The demographics, missions, and
weapons of the United States military in 2008 bear little resemblance to
20. Id. at 2862 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Brief Amicus Curiae of Retired Military Officers in
Support of Respondent, Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2387 (No. o7-29o).
21. See id.
22. See id. at 2847-7o.
23. See, e.g., EDWARD M. COFFMAN, THE OLD ARMY: A PORTRAIT OF THE AMERICAN ARMY IN
PEACETIME, 1784-1898, at 96-102, 269-86 (1986) (describing the transition to military professionalism);
ALLAN R. MILLETr, THE GENERAL: ROBERT L. BULLARD AND OFFICERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY,
1881-1925, at 3-12 (1975) (describing professionalization); MATTHEW MOTEN, THE DELAFELD
COMMISSION AND THE AMERICAN MILITARY PROFESSION 3-17 (20OO) (providing an overview of the
historiography of military professionalism).
24. See, e.g., ELIZABETII LurTEs HILLMAN, DEFENDING AMERICA: MILITARY CULTURE AND THE COLD
WAR COURT-MARTIAL 8 (2OO5).
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those of the Continental Army, the militias that struggled to defend the
young nation after that army was quickly disbanded in 1783, or the small
professional army that Congress created in 1784 and expanded in the
1790s.2"
The Continental Army was composed only of men 6 (save those few
women who disguised themselves27) but was racially integrated, since
enslaved African Americans were promised freedom in exchange for
military service in the North." George Washington served without pay as
the army's commanding general;29 he considered the army a temporary
measure and shared the fear of many early American leaders about the
dangers of a standing army.3" Military leadership in Washington's era was
an "art," "a pastime engaged in by men whose success in civic affairs and
business encouraged, or perhaps obliged, them to serve in uniform."3
Officers hailed from the upper classes, often held political office as well,
and were self-educated with respect to military strategy and tactics.32
General Washington's soldiers were paid volunteers who enlisted for
periods of one to three years.33 The Continental Congress established
rules for the Army that followed "the basic features of eighteenth
century military administration: relatively long-term enlistments; a rigid
distinction between officers and enlisted men; a strict regimen of
25. This Part does not explore the colonial militias but focuses instead on the regular armies of
the young United States, since those regular armies are much closer to the contemporary armed forces
in style and make-up than are the militias. See, e.g., F.W. Anderson, Why Did Colonial New
Englanders Make Bad Soldiers?, in THE MILITARY IN AMERICA: FROM THE COLONIAL ERA TO THE
PRESENT 36 (Peter Karsten ed., rev. ed. 1986) (detailing the colonial militias); The Boston Press Gang
Riot of 1747, in THE MILITARY IN AMERICA, supra, at 55 (same); A Letter from Samuel Adams, in THE
MILITARY IN AMERICA, supra, at 59, 59-61 (same); North Carolina Militia Act of 1774, in THE MILITARY
IN AMERICA, supra, at 53 (same); John W. Shy, A New Look at Colonial Militia, in THE MILITARY IN
AMERICA, supra, at 27 (same).
26. See generally CHARLES ROYSTER, A REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE AT WAR: THE CONTINENTAL ARMY
AND AMERICAN CHARACTER, 1775-1783 (979).
27. See, e.g., JEANNE HOLM, WOMEN IN THE MILITARY: AN UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 3-5 (rev. ed.
1992).
28. See, e.g., PETER M. VOELZ, SLAVE AND SOLDIER: THE MILITARY IMPACT OF BLACKS IN THE
COLONIAL AMERICAS 389"91(I993); JOSEPH T. WILSON, THE BLACK PHALANX 21-71 (Da Capo Press
1994) (1887).
29. See, e.g., EDWARD G. LENGEL, GENERAL GEORGE WASHINGTON: A MILITARY LIFE (2005).
30. See, e.g., ROYSTER, supra note 26, at 52, 200. See generally THE UNITED STATES MILITARY
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1989 (Richard H. Kohn ed., i99i) (discussing
how the Constitution has played a role in shaping the military); RUSSELL F. WEIGLEY, THE AMERICAN
WAY OF WAR: A HISTORY OF UNITED STATES MILITARY STRATEGY AND POLICY (Ind. Univ. Press
Paperback ed., Ind. Univ. Press I977) ('973).
31. Elizabeth L. Hillman, Gentlemen Under Fire: The U.S. Military and "Conduct Unbecoming,"
26 LAW & INEQ. I, 12 (2008).
32. See, e.g., id. at 12-15 (describing the status and integration of officers into civil society in the
eighteenth century).
33. See, e.g., WILLIAM B. SKELTON, AN AMERICAN PROFESSION OF ARMS: THE ARMY OFFICER CORPS,
1784-1861, at 4 (1992).
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discipline and punishment; and specialized staff departments to handle
supply and support functions."' Yet turnover was constant, leading one
historian to describe the citizen-soldiers as "Winter Soldiers and
Springtime Farmers."35 The army at its peak fielded 19,000 men,36 only
half of whom possessed "some small approximation of regular military
skill and discipline,"37 and was often much smaller. Turnover was a
constant problem, eventually resulting in longer enlistments as well as
bounties and other incentives." Discipline was poor and training mostly
inadequate.39
After the Treaty of Paris ended the Revolutionary War, soldiers
were quickly mustered out, leaving only a vestigial force of a few
hundred men.'0 The army was disbanded without major incident, a
notable achievement in itself." When the few troops remaining proved
themselves not up to the task (they suffered devastating defeats at the
hands of allied Native American tribes on the frontier4"), Congress
authorized additional troops;43 in 1791, the authorized strength of the
army was about 5400." While the Continental Army sought primarily to
outlast its larger, better-trained, and better-armed opponent, the first
army of the United States sought to wrest territory from Native
Americans45 and defend against European interests in North America.46
Hence, the early American military was small, nonprofessional, led by
social elites, all male, and intended to promote the conquest of land.
Compare this portrait to the U.S. Army today, which is big,
permanent, professional, led by a meritocratic officer corps, nearly one-
seventh female, and intended to promote and protect U.S. interests all
over the world.47 By looking only at the Army, we set aside the other
military services-the Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and at times the
Coast Guard-and sharpen the focus on the distinctions between the
34. Id.
35. ROBERT A. GROSS, THE MINUTEMEN AND THEIR WORLD 3 (1976).
36. See, e.g., WEIGLEY, supra note 30. at 4.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 4-6; see also CAROLINE Cox, A PROPER SENSE OF HONOR: SERVICE AND SACRIFICE IN
GEORGE WASHINGTON'S ARMY 73-I I8 (2004).
39. See, e.g., FRANCIS D. COGLIANO, REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 1763-i815: A POLITICAL HISTORY
72-73 (1999).
40. See, e.g., SKELTON, supra note 33.
41. See Richard H. Kohn, The Inside History of the Newburgh Conspiracy, in THE MILITARY IN
AMERICA, supra note 25, at 79, 9-9"1; see also RICHARD H. KOHN, EAGLE AND SWORD: THE BEGINNINGS
OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IN AMERICA 17-39 (1975) [hereinafter KOHN, EAGLE AND SWORD].
42. KOHN, EAGLE AND SWORD, supra note 41.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., SKELTON, supra note 33, at 5.
45. Id. at 5-6.
46. Id. at 6.
47. Elizabeth L. Hillman, The Female Shape of the All-Volunteer Force, in IRAQ AND THE LESSONS
OF VIETNAM 150, 155 (Marilyn B. Young & Lloyd C. Gardner eds., 2007).
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"well regulated militia" of the late eighteenth century and the army of
the Heller era. On December 31, 2008, there were 542,565 people on
active duty in the army8 -more than 100 times congressional
authorization in 1791.' 9 In 2008, women in the Army alone numbered
more than 73,000, with more than 13,000 female army officers.0 In June
2008, there were more army personnel (19,826) deployed in the Pacific
Theater than were ever in the Continental Army;5 almost 45,000 others
were stationed in NATO countries,52 and 117,000 more in Iraq." The
sheer size of the Army today dwarfs the military contemplated by the
Framers of the Constitution. This is not a new phenomenon; the number
of people in the armed forces in the United States has not dropped below
one million since 1950."4
The bureaucracy of the Army is both massive and Byzantine; it
manages both a reserve (the Army Reserve and Army National Guard)
and an active component.5 The army's official website explains that
"[t]he operational Army consists of numbered armies, corps, divisions,
brigades, and battalions that conduct full spectrum operations around the
world. ' ', 6 As of February 2009, it includes three headquarters commands,
nine component commands, and eleven direct reporting units. 7 The
Army has twenty-nine divisions, 58 twenty-six permanent camps located
outside the United States,59 forty-three forts within the United States,6
61
and even fifty-five museums. It boasts glossy magazines, promotional
48. DEP'T OF DEF., ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY
CoUNTRY (3o9A) DECEMBER 31, 2008 (2oo8), available at http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mWpersonnel/MLrTARY/
Miltop.htm.
49. See SKELTON, supra note 33, at 5.
5o. DEP'T OF DEF., ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL BY RANK/GRADE: SEPTEMBER 30, 2008
(WOMEN ONLY) (2O08), available at http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/rgo8o9f.pdf.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. DEP'T OF DEF., ACTIVE DUrY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY
COUNTRY (3o9A): JUNE 30, 2008 (2OO8), available at http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/
history/hsto8o6.pdf.
54. Military Personnel Historical Reports, http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnelMILITARY/history/
3o9hist.htm (last visited June so, 2009).
55. See, e.g., GoArmy.com, http://www.goarmy.com (last visited June 1o, 2009).
56. United States Army-Organization, http://www.army.mil/info/organization/ (last visited June
10, 2009).
57. Id.
58. United States Army-Army Divisions, httpJ/www.army.mil/info/organization/unitsandcommands/
divisions/ (last visited June 1o, 2009).
59. United States Army-Camps, http://www.army.mil/info/organizationlinstallations/camps/ (last
visited June so, 2009).
60. United States Army-Forts, http://www.army.mil/info/organization/installations/forts/ (last
visited June 10, 2009).
61. United States Army-Museums, http://www.army.mil/info/organization/installations/museums/
(last visited June 1o, 2009).
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posters, and free downloads, 6' and pays for sophisticated advertising as
well as economic incentives to boost recruiting efforts; in 2008, the Army
began offering $40,000 to high school graduates who commit to five years
of service.
63
The U.S. Army in 2009 is integrated by race, gender, age, and
occupational specialty.64 The spectrum of military jobs has shifted
considerably since the eighteenth century. In the early twenty-first
century, fewer than 17% of military positions are officially "combat"
jobs;6 most are instead classified as "technical" and "administrative." 66
Women, however, are not assigned evenly across career fields because of
the rule that precludes them from participating in direct ground combat.
67
As a result, women are less than 2.5% of the dead68 and less than 2% of
the wounded in the ongoing war in Iraq.69 Initial terms of service range
from two to six years of active duty followed by a comparable length of
time in the reserves;7" the average length of service is less than ten years.'
Hundreds of thousands of civilians perform military-like functions for
the U.S. government; some 675,000 civilians were employed by the
Department of Defense alone in December 2008.72 Many have criticized
this "outsourcing" as a resort to mercenaries,7 yet another distinction
from the military forces of the colonial era and early republic.
Revolutionary War-era leaders rejected mercenaries in part because
they felt citizens were obliged to perform military service for the states.74
United States military operations have often included occupations
and other non-war-fighting efforts, but the peacekeeping missions of the
62. See United States Army-Soldiers Magazine Publication, http://www.army.mil/publications/
soldiersmagazine/ (last visited June 1o, 2009).
63. John McChesney, Army Offers $4oK Recruiting Bonus to H.S. Grads, NPR, Feb. 5, 2008,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=18710386. See generally GoArmy.com, supra
note 55.
64. See David R. Segal & Mady Wechsler Segal, America's Military Population, POPULATION
BULL., Dec. 2004, at 22 tbl.3, available at http://www.prb.org/Source/ACF1396.pdf.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., Hillman, supra note 47, at 150.
68. DEP'T OF DEF., OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM MILITARY DEATHS, MAR. 19, 2003 THROUGH JULY 4,
2009, available at http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personneY/CASUALTY/oif-deaths-total.pdf.
69. DEP'T OF DEF., OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM MILITARY WOUNDED IN ACTION, MAR. 19 2003-MAY
2, 20o9, available at http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnelVCASUALTY/oif-wounded-total.pdf.
70. See Segal & Segal, supra note 64, at Io.
71. Id.
72. See DEP'T OF DEF., CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS: DECEMBER 2008 (2008), http://
siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/CIVILIAN/fy2oo9/december2oo8/december2oo8.pdf.
73. See, e.g., FROM MERCENARIES TO MARKET: THE RISE AND REGULATION OF PRIVATE MILITARY
COMPANIES (Simon Chesterman & Chia Lehnardt eds., 2007).
74. See, e.g., John Whiteclay Chambers II, American Views of Conscription and the German
Nation in Arms in the Franco-Prussian War, in THE PEOPLE IN ARMS: MILITARY MYTH AND NATIONAL
MOBILIZATION SINCE THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 75 (Daniel Moran ed., 2003); GORDON S. WOOD, THE
AMERICAN REVOLUrION: A HISTORY 92-93 (2002).
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Cold War and the post-9/11 wars have moved the armed forces in many
new directions.7" Troops and government contractors routinely perform
law enforcement and governing functions rather than more traditional
military missions.76 On June 30, 2008, 280,00o U.S. military personnel
were stationed in some 149 countries and onboard ships underway,
including 183,ooo in Iraq and 32,000 in Afghanistan."
The technological changes that have altered American war fighting
are every bit as transformative as the shifts in military demographics and
missions. The Heller opinions suggest the changes in small arms: the
handguns of the late eighteenth century were a far cry from current
handguns." The technological revolutions that have altered the way in
which the United States fights are far more profound, however, than the
development of more reliable, more powerful pistols and rifles. The
advent of nuclear weapons and aerial bombing, for example, created
well-known strategic and legal challenges for military and civilian
leaders. 9 Moreover, the preferred method of American war-fighting in
the early twenty-first century, bombing from the air, was entirely
unknown by late eighteenth century war fighters and political leaders.
At that time, hot-air balloons were considered a potential resource for
surveillance but not for bombing, because the wild inaccuracy of bombs
dropped from balloons rendered them virtually useless for that purpose.8,
Note that the tactic (bombing from the air), not the target (civilians), is
what changed; the intentional targeting of civilians in warfare was
routine, not unfathomable, in the eighteenth century.s2 Yet the size and
power of the American military, and the pace at which it moves and
75. See generally ANDREW J. BACEVICH, THE NEW AMERICAN MILITARISM: How AMERICANS ARE
SEDUCED BY WAR (2005).
76. See, e.g., P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY
(2003).
77. See DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 53.
78. See, e.g., Nicholas J. Johnson, Supply Restrictions at the Margins of Heller and the Abortion
Analogue: Stenberg Principles, Assault Weapons, and the Attitudinalist Critique, 6o HASTINGS L.J. 1285,
1292-96 (2OO9); Don B. Kates & Clayton E. Cramer, Second Amendment Limitations and
Criminological Considerations, 6o HASTINGS L.J. 1339, 1356-58 (2009).
79. See, e.g., ROBERT A. PAPE, BOMBING TO WIN: AIR POWER AND COERCION IN WAR (1996)
(assessing the effectiveness of bombing in warfighting); THE CASE AGAINST THE BOMB: MARSHALL
ISLANDS, SAMOA, AND SOLOMON ISLANDS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE IN ADVISORY
PROCEEDINGS ON THE LEGALITY OF THE THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (Roger S. Clark &
Madeleine Sann eds., 1996) (presenting arguments regarding the illegality of nuclear weapons).
8o. See, e.g., BOMBING CIVILIANS: A TWENTIETH CENTURY HISTORY (Yuki Tanaka & Marilyn B.
Young eds., 2009) (exploring the popularity and consequences of aerial bombing).
81. See, e.g., TAMI DAVIS BIDDLE, RHETORIC AND REALITY IN AIR WARFARE: THE EVOLUTION OF
BRITISH AND AMERICAN IDEAS ABOUT STRATEGIC BOMBING, 1914-1945 (2002).
82. See, e.g., JOHN GRENIER, THE FIRST WAY OF WAR: AMERICAN WAR MAKING ON THE FRONTIER,
16o7-i814, at 5 (20o5) (calling the intentional targeting of civilians a "ubiquitous albeit darker side of
American military history"). See generally THE BARBARIZATION OF WARFARE (George Kassimeris ed.,
2006) (contemplating the capacity for, and limits of, brutality in the history of warfare).
June 2009]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
communicates in 2009, could hardly have been contemplated by the
drafters of the Second Amendment. Even military uniforms have gone
digital; the Army's fatigues and "battle dress uniform" have been
replaced by an "army combat uniform" with a digitally generated, all-
terrain camouflage pattern. s
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE RIGHT TO SERVE IN THE MILITARY
Although the Court neglected the history of the American military
in its Heller decision, that history bears directly on the relationship of
military service to the Constitution. As Justice Scalia wrote in Heller, the
idea that the Second Amendment protects "only those arms in existence
in the 18th century" borders on the "frivolous," because "we do riot
interpret constitutional rights that way."' True enough; we do not
interpret constitutional rights as if military technology or society stalled
in 1791 with the single shot pocket pistol and the Corps of Artillerists. 85
Just as the right to keep and bear arms must be interpreted in light of
contemporary weapons, the right to protect and defend the Constitution
deserves consideration in light of contemporary military institutions and
constitutional doctrine. The all-volunteer American armed forces are
more powerful than ever before in terms of both their destructive
potential and their function in confirming citizenship."' Because of that
very power, the Constitution must protect the right to serve in the armed
forces.
In Heller, Justice Scalia scolded those who might read the Second
Amendment as granting a right to bear arms in military service s7 In the
course of dismissing Justice Stevens's reading of the meaning of the
Second Amendment, Justice Scalia wrote that Justice Stevens's
"idiomatic meaning would cause the protected right to consist of the
right to be a soldier or to wage war-an absurdity that no commentator
has ever endorsed. ' '88 Conventional legal argument supports Justice
Scalia and rejects a constitutional right to serve in the military.S9 For
83. See, e.g., USA Contracts for New Army Combat Uniforms in ACUPA T Camo, DEF. INDUSTRY
DAILY, Feb. 2, 2009, http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/usa-contracts-for-new-army-combat-uniforms-
in-acupat-camo-03024/#more (describing a new contract for army uniforms).
84. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 278 3 , 279I (2008).
85. See, e.g., SKELTON, supra note 33, at 25 (describing the Corps of Artillerists in the late
eighteenth century army); Kates & Cramer, supra note 78 (discussing the pocket pistol).
86. See infra notes 96, 1 IO-17 and accompanying text.
87. See 128 S. Ct. at 2794-98 & n.16; Amar, supra note 2, at 189.
88. Heller, 128 S. Ct at 2794.
89. See, e.g., Caitlin Daniel-McCarter, Comment, Homophobia Through The First Amendment: A
Critique Of Fair v. Rumsfeld, io N.Y. CITY L. REV. 199, 201 n.II (2oo6) (citing OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y OF
DEF., SUMMARY REPORT OF THE MILITARY WORKING GROUP (1993), which was issued by President
Clinton's Military Working Group in considering the homosexual conduct policy of the military, which
relied on the absence of any right to serve in the military); Sam Nunn, The Fundamental Principles of
the Supreme Court's Jurisprudence in Military Cases, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 557, 559 (1994) (citing
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example, in its findings section, the "don't ask, don't tell" statute that
bars service by openly lesbian or gay persons states explicitly that
"[t]here is no constitutional right to serve in the armed forces."'
Yet leading constitutional theorists have hinted that the political
valence of military service has made access to the military a fundamental
aspect of citizenship and therefore an as-yet unacknowledged
constitutional right." Those hints, however, have been made
"hesitantly."9 The last extended argument for military service as a
constitutional right appeared in 1995, triggered by the controversy
surrounding the crafting and implementation of "don't ask, don't tell."93
The issue of the right to military service has been left largely
unexamined, notwithstanding frequent criticism of military
discrimination on the basis of gender and sexual orientation.'
Recognizing a Second Amendment-based right to military service would
not require the armed forces to accept anyone unqualified into their
ranks. It would, however, prohibit "wholesale exclusions based on
stereotypical assumptions. '
The Heller Court's reading of the Second Amendment opens the
door to reassessing the right to military service. If, as Heller asserts and
most constitutional scholars seem to agree, 6 the Second Amendment
protects an individual right to keep and bear arms for the purposes of
self-defense, it also protects an individual right to keep and bear arms for
the purposes of collective defense-which is, after all, an uncontroversial
and core purpose of the Constitution itself.' This argument need not rest
Nieszner v. Mark, 684 F.2d 562, 564 (8th Cir. 1982); West v. Brown, 558 F.2d 757, 760 (5th Cir. i977)).
9o . io U.S.C. § 654(a)(2) (2oo6).
9 i . See, e.g., CAss R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE
WRONG FOR AMERICA 219-23 (2005) (arguing that the Second Amendment supports a right to
collective defense); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, Ioo YALE L.J. It31, 1132
(i99i) (arguing that the Bill of Rights protects "various intermediate associations" including service in
the military); Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term-Foreword: The Document and the
Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 128 (2000) (commenting on the right to military service); Michael C.
Dorf, What Does the Second Amendment Mean Today?, 76 CHi-KENT L. REV. 291, 343 (2000)
(articulating "a right of the people to keep and bear arms-that is, a right to serve in the military");
Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L.
REV. 499, 5 0 (I99I) (arguing that military service confirms citizenship and engenders inequality
through sex discrimination).
92. Dorf, supra note 9 i , at 343 n.226.
93. See generally Carl Riehl, Uncle Sam Has to Want You: The Right of Gay Men and Lesbians
(and All Other Americans) to Bear Arms in the Military, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 343 (1995).
94. See, e.g., NATHANIEL FRANK, UNFRIENDLY FIRE: How THE GAY BAN UNDERMINES THE MILITARY
AND WEAKENS AMERICA (2oo9).
95. Dorf, supra note 91.
96. See generally Carl T. Bogus, The History and Politics of Second Amendment Scholarship: A
Primer, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3 (2000).
97. See, e.g., SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE
ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA, at x-xi (2oo6) (construing the Second Amendment as a source
of civic rights and obligations, including defense of the nation); Douglas W. Kmiec, Observing the
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on an interpretation of the Second Amendment's original intent; it
stands alone, on the undisputed grounds that the government created by
the Constitution must be able to defend itself. In order to defend itself,
the Constitution permitted a wide range of executive and legislative
actions related to the use of military force."s Given how those actions,
authorized by explicit constitutional provisions,' have grown to embrace
the funding and operation of massive, permanent twenty-first century
armed forces, the related power of the people to assert control over
those forces must also have grown proportionately. This control can only
be realized through an individual right to serve in the military.
Carl Riehl's 1995 analysis of the Second Amendment sets forth the
outline of constitutional arguments in favor of a right to military
service. " Riehl asserted that the Constitution's embrace of a civic
republican framework requires "direct citizen control" over government
force and that such control must be manifested through an individual
right to military service. ,"' He also suggested that judicial deference to
the military is particularly inappropriate so long as military service is not
open to all citizens.' 2 Two sets of interpretive arguments, redefined in
the wake of Heller, confirm the constitutional dimensions of the right to
serve in the military under the Second Amendment. First, the
Constitution embraces a vision of civic republicanism that links political
and military participation and requires opening military service to all
citizens."° Second, popular understanding of military service as an
obligation of citizenship requires recognition of equality in military
opportunity. "
Together, the notion of a robust civic republic and a popular
constitutionalism make a powerful case for the end of categorical
distinctions based on sex and sexual orientation in eligibility for, and
specific assignment to, military duty in the United States. Many Supreme
Court opinions have noted the profound meaning of military service in
the life of the nation and its citizens. I"5 This is readily apparent in cases
Separation of Powers: The President's War Power Necessarily Remains "The Power To Wage War
Successfully," 53 DaKE L. REV. 851, 853-54 (2005) (pointing out the President's constitutional role in
"collective defense" of the nation).
98. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CoNsTUnoN: A BIOGRAPHY 51 (2005).
99. Id.
ioo. See Riehl, supra note 93, at 344-45.
ioi. See id. at 344-53.
102. See id. at 345; see also, e.g., Diane H. Mazur, Rehnquist's Vietnam: Constitutional Separatism
and the Stealth Advance of Martial Law, 77 IND. L.J. 701, 701-41 (2002) (tracing the development of a
doctrine of judicial deference that shielded legislative and executive decisions from judicial review);
Jonathan Turley, The Military Pocket Republic, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 95-133 (2002) (criticizing
excessive deference to the military).
IO3. See infra note to and accompanying text.
IO4. See infra notes 1o7-o8 and accompanying text.
io5. See infra notes io7--o8 and accompanying text.
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upholding conscription.' ° Perhaps most famously, Chief Justice Edward
Douglass White, writing for a unanimous Court in defending the draft
during World War I, stated that "[t]he highest duty of the citizen is to
bear arms at the call of the nation," and that "the very conception of a
just government and its duty to the citizen includes the reciprocal
obligation of the citizen to render military service in case of need and the
right to compel it.""'° In 1929, the Court, in upholding the rejection of a
naturalization application by Rosika Schwimmer, a pacifist and war
resister who refused to agree to "take up arms in defense" of the country,
asserted that "the duty of citizens by force of arms to defend our
government against all enemies whenever necessity arises is a
fundamental principle of the Constitution."'" The statute requiring
registration for the draft in midcentury stated that "in a free society the
obligations and privileges of military training and service should be
shared generally."'" Political theory supports these statements of
legislative and judicial authorities regarding the significance of military
service to full citizenship. For example, Amar refers to "the classical
republican vision underlying the Second Amendment, a vision that
linked military and political participation ....
An approach based on popular constitutionalism also supports the
right to serve in the military. Heller may be best understood as the
triumph of the gun rights movement rather than the doctrine of
originalism, making the right to bear arms dependent on a democratic
model of constitutional decision making."' The common understanding
of the right to serve in the military is at least as potent as the common
understanding of the right to defend oneself with a handgun. This may be
clearest in the discourse of civil rights in the United States, which has
deep roots in military service. ' Americans, quite apart from judicial
io6. See, e.g., Jill E. Hasday, Fighting Women: The Military, Sex, and Extrajudicial Constitutional
Change, 93 MINN. L. REV. 96, 104-05 (2008) (exploring the deep "connection between military service
and full citizenship in cases upholding conscription from World War I to the Vietnam era").
lo7. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 368, 378-8o, 390 (1918), cited in LINDA K. KERBER,
No CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES: WOMEN AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF CmZENSHIP 246 (1998).
io8. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 647, 650 (1929), cited in KERBER, supra note 107, at
246-47. Note that Schwimmer and other cases were reversed in 1946 by Girouard v. United States, 328
U.S. 61, 64 (1946), in which Justice William Douglas wrote for the Court: "The bearing of arms,
important as it is, is not the only way in which our institutions may be supported and defended, even in
times of great peril.... Refusal to bear arms is not necessarily a sign of disloyalty .... "
1O9. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 1, 54 Stat. 885, 885 (1940).
iIo. Amar, supra note 2, at 188.
I I I. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller,
122 HARV. L. REV. 191 (2oo8) (arguing that social movements and popular constitutionalism underlie
Justice Scalia's reasoning despite his disavowal).
112. See infra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
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pronouncements, have long understood that the privilege of citizenship
entails an obligation to serve in the military."'
The importance of military service in the history of race-based
claims of political equality in the United States is well-recognized." 4
African American military participation in every past American war was
triggered in part by aspirations for full citizenship, and was a key source
of support for post-war claims of equality."' Frederick Douglass
recruited African Americans to fight the Civil War because he, like many
others, was convinced that once a black man had "an eagle on his button
and a musket on his shoulder," there was "no power on earth" that could
deny him citizenship."6 Military service has been a centerpiece of the
citizenship aspirations of groups other than African Americans as well.
Other racial minorities, undocumented immigrants, women, and lesbians
and gay men have pressed for access to the risks and sacrifices of military
service as a means to gain the privileges and benefits of full citizenship.'
Official practices of the federal government promote the special role
of military service in conferring the status of citizenship in the United
States. For example, the military recruiting program used to attract
noncitizens with language skills was expanded in February 2009 to
include people living in the United States on temporary visas." 8 The
military now offers citizenship in six months to immigrants who enlist,'
revealing both how far the 2009 American military has ventured from its
origins and how essential military service is to citizenship 2 Far from
113. See, e.g., KERBER, supra note 1o7, at 236.
114. See, e.g., JAMES E. WESTHEIDER, FIGHTING ON Two FRONTS: AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE
VIETNAM WAR 8-9 (1997) (describing African Americans' hopes of racial equality based on shared
sacrifice in the Vietnam war); James W. Fox Jr., Intimations of Citizenship: Repressions and
Expressions of Equal Citizenship in the Era of Jim Crow, 50 How. L.J. 113, 143 (2oo6) (noting military
service as the "highest of male citizenship activities" and its role in the citizenship claims of African
American men); Darlene C. Goring, In Service to America: Naturalization of Undocumented Alien
Veterans, I SETON HALL L. REV. 400, 473-77 (2000) (analyzing the importance of military service to
African American claims of citizenship); Rebecca J. Scott, Public Rights, Social Equality, and The
Conceptual Roots of the Plessy Challenge, lo6 MICH. L. REV. 777, 786 (20o8) (describing the
importance of military service in the development of nineteenth-century claims to full citizenship).
115. See, e.g., RONALD R. KREBS, FIGHTING FOR RIGHTS: MILITARY SERVICE AND THE POLITICS OF
CITIZENSHIP 181-96 (2o06).
116. Goring, supra note 114, at 476.
117. See, e.g., KERBER, supra note 1O7, at 221-302 (analyzing the citizenship of women and military
obligation); RANDY SHJLTS, CONDUCT UNBECOMING: GAYS AND LESBIANS IN THE U.S. MILITARY (1993)
(detailing the service of lesbian and gay Americans); Devon W. Carbado, Black Rights, Gay Rights,
Civil Rights, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1467, 1495-96 (2o00); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Relationship
Between Obligations and Rights of Citizens, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1721, 1744 (2001) (recognizing
military service as "essential to claims of equal citizenship"); Goring, supra note 114 (advocating
military service as a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants); Hasday, supra note io6.
I 8. See Julia Preston, U.S. Military Will Offer Path to Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2009, at
At.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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undermining this deeply rooted tradition of the citizen-soldier, early
twenty-first century intellectual and political trends alike seem to be
elevating the citizen-soldier to new heights. Consider the popularity of
Victor Hanson's work, often assigned in courses on military history and
political science, which argues that the civic soldier is not only worthy of
respect, but is in fact morally superior to other persons in social and
political life.'21
CONCLUSION
In 2009, we ask our standing military to undertake missions
inconceivable, to use weapons with destructive power unimaginable, to
train and integrate persons into a force of a size unfathomable, to the
Framers of the Constitution. If there exists a clear, unassailable common
understanding that the Second Amendment protects more than the
muskets fired in the Battle of Bunker Hill, it must also protect an
individual right to participate in the defense of the nation, a right rooted
in the nature of citizenship itself. Women, and gays and lesbians, cannot
be categorically excluded or restricted from full military service.
Ending discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender is
critical because of the gender-based arguments that appear in Heller2'
and that are repeatedly voiced in favor of a right to handguns for
individual self-defense. Supporters of the Second Amendment's
individual rights theory often point to guns as a means of self-defense
especially appropriate for women."3 Women, the argument goes, lack the
physical vigor and strength to overpower attackers and are therefore in
particular need of the equalizing power of a handgun.'24 This argument is
a canard; it obscures the issue of equality of opportunity across
distinctions of gender and sexuality. Women and homosexuals do not
need guns under their pillows. They need the respect only granted to full-
fledged citizens. Lifting the restrictions on women's military
participation, and removing the half-hearted "ban" on service by openly
gay and lesbian servicemembers, are much more significant steps toward
ending gender discrimination and all of its corollaries, including sexual
and domestic violence, than is protecting women's rights to use handguns
in self-defense.
121. VICTOR DAVIS HANSON, CARNAGE AND CULTURE 44o-56 (2OOI).
122. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2858 (2oo8) (Breyer J., dissenting)
(describing the value of guns to women in self-defense).
123. See, e.g., Kates & Cramer, supra note 78, at 1367 & n.i67 (arguing that taking guns "deprives
victims of the only means of self-defense with which the weak can defeat predation by the strong").
124. Id.
June 2009]
1284 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6o: 1269
